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Abstract
RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) is a powerful technology that, due
to its numerous advantages, is supposed to replace the various identification
systems such as barcodes or magnetic stripes in a short time. There are
three devices involved in an RFID protocols: a Reader, a Tag, and a back-
end Database. One of the key factors for the RFID technology is that, in
order to be used on large scale, the price of the Tags has to be cheap: it
cannot be expensive because who is supposed to use it would need a great
amount of them, furthermore, Tags must have very small dimensions. The
low-cost nature of such devices implies that it is impossible to use traditional
cryptographic protocols on them, furthermore, there are certain Tags that
could not even generate random numbers or use basic hashing functions,
these Tags are called Ultra-Lightweight. Many experts are trying to build
secure protocols that involve only simple bitwise logical operations for the
Ultra-Lightweight Tags, but, unfortunately, each one of these protocols, that
was supposed to be secure, turned out to be vulnerable to some serious
attack after short time from pubblication. The need for a secure RFID
authentication protocol today seems more urgent than ever, because this
technology is already used for security purposes, such as electronic passports.
The challenge to build a secure protocol for Ultra-Lightweight RFID systems
is so hard that in several years no one has been able to build one. In this
thesis we analyse in great detail a recently proposed protocol for Ultra-
Lightweight RFID systems called SLAP [1], with the aim of finding new
vulnerabilities. SLAP has already been violated (along with a set of similar
protocols) by Safkhani and Bagheri [5], that have recently published a de-
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synchronization attack. At the end of our analysis, we will propose an
impersonification attack to the protocol, along with a fix for our attack and
some considerations on the attacks proposed on this kind of protocols.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The RFID (acronym of Radio-Frequency Identification) is a technology which
allows automatic recognition of things. The RFID schema consists of three
entities: a Reader, a Tag, and a back-end Database. Through radiofre-
quencies, the Reader can communicate with the Tag and read/update its
contents. This technology can be used in a variety of fields: for example elec-
tronic passports, credit cards, warehouse logistics, etc; and, in the last years,
it is rapidly spreading thanks to its numerous advantages over the others
common identification systems (like barcodes or magnetic stripe-systems).
The advantages over the traditional identification systems are countless, for
example, compared to a barcode, an RFID Tag doesn’t need to be visible
to be read, and it is possible to read many Tags at the same time. More-
over, the Tags are waterproof and heat-resistant. To get a practical idea of
how these advantages are valuable, just think that in a certain warehouse,
if the items were identified by RFID Tags, in a single instant it would be
possible to know all the contents of a box full of items, without opening
it. The functioning mechanism is very simple: the Tag contains a series
of informations regarding, for example, an item; the Reader is capable to
read/uptate that information, and the back-end Database manages all that
kind of information. For this technology to have sense, each entity of the
system must satisfy certain requirements, in particular, there are certain
important restrictions concerning the building of the Tag: size and price.
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Indeed, for this autentication system to be e ective, we don’t want the size
of the Tags to be relevant: instead, we want them being so small that we
don’t need to care about (how could you insert a few centimeters-big Tag
inside a credit card?). Furthermore, we don’t even want to care about their
price: even a small cost, multiplied by the number of thousands of items in
a warehouse, could make their use less desirable. In the real world, Tags are
so small that they can be easily put inside credit cards, and their prices is,
in the most of the cases, below 0.05$. Because of the important restrictions
on size and price, it is normal that even performances are limited: in most
cases the total amount of logic gates on a Tag is between 5’000 and 10’000,
and of these logic gates only a small amount (between 250 and 3’000) can
be used for security purposes. You may wonder why the security of the
RFID systems is a questions that matters, thinking about RFID Tags used
to store some informations on an item inside a clothes shop: firstly, it is
important to stress the fact that the Readers not only can read, but they
can also write inside a Tag, and we don’t want a potential Attacker to be
capable of randomly update prices inside a shop; secondly, these tiny devices
are also used to store important information about, for example, passports,
credit cards, and even dogs! In this section, we introduced why security of
Reader-Tag communication is important, without mentioning the last en-
tity of our system, the Database. Since the Database and the Reader don’t
have important restrictions, they can secure their communications through
traditional cryptographic protocols, and so we don’t need to care about that.
1.1 RFID Authentication Protocols
Because of the impossibility of using traditional cryptographic protocols
in the communication between Reader and Tag, and since there isn’t any
known secure protocol that can work with a so little computing power, many
new protocols are being devised for this specific purpose. These protocols
are divided into four categories, organized according to the power of the
devices:
1. Full-Fledged: These protocols are suitable for very powerful Tags,
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which have enough computing power that they can incorporate tradi-
tional cryptography, like one-way hashing functions.
2. Simple: This kind of protocols support pseudo-random number gen-
eration and one-way hashing functions only.
3. Lightweight: This cathegory of protocols refers to Tags being capable
of generating random numbers, and computing simple functions like
CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Code) ckecksum, but not hashing functions.
4. Ultra-Lightweight: These protocols are referred to the majority of
Tags, that are the Tags that can only compute simple bitwise logical
operations, like AND, OR, XOR, etc. Random number generation
isn’t possible by this kind of Tag.
The most interesting category, as regards research, is the category of
Ultra-Lightweight protocols: it may seem impossible to keep important data
like passports informations, or credit cards codes, secure, through a protocol
that uses only simple bitwise logical operations... and indeed someone thinks
it is. This challenge has involved many experts, and for this reason every year
many new Ultra-Lightweight protocols are proposed. Even though many new
protocols arised, there is still not a single Ultra-Lightweight protocol that is
known to be secure, on the contrary, citing the authors of the SLAP protocol:
”Unfortunately, it is quite usual that the time for publication of a serious
attack on a new scheme is extremely short. This is a good phenomenon and
at the same time gives us some admonishment”.
1.2 The GUMAP Protocols
A series of recently proposed Ultra-Lightweight protocols (between 2015
and 2017) has got a structure very similar to a first protocol called RAPP .
Some examples are the protocols R2APP , RCIA [3], KMAP [4], SLAP [1]
and SASI+ [2]; they are identified under the name GUMAP (Generalized
Ultra-Lightweight Mutual Autentication Protocols). These protocols follow
a similar structure: first of all, both the Tag and the Reader know two IDs:
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IDold and IDnew, and each ID have an associated couple of keys: knew1
knew2 , and kold1 kold2 . The protocol starts with an HELLO message sent from
the Reader to the Tag, that, once received the message, responds with its
IDnew, which is used by the Reader to fetch the associated couple of keys,
knew1 and knew2 , from the Database. If the Reader isn’t able to associate the
received ID with a couple of keys, it sends another HELLO to the Tag,
which then will respond with its IDold. At this point, if the Reader has a
couple of associated keys, the protocol will be executed with these keys and
ID, otherwise, the protocol will be aborted.
Once it has fetched the keys, the Reader generates a random number n, and
the three values (k1, k2 and n) are given in input to a certain function, that
varies from one protocol to another, and the computed message is sent to
the Tag, that, knowing k1 and k2, is able to retrieve the random number n.
The aim of this operation is to hide the number n, in a way that let us
sending it through an insecure channel, without the risk that an attacker
who eavesdropped the message would identify it. At this point both the
Tag and the Reader knows the three values, and they exchange some other
messages to understand if the values on the other side are the same; then,
if the Tag or the Reader notices that the values on the other device are
di erent, the protocol is aborted, otherwise, a new triplet of values IDnew
knew1 k
new
2 is generated and the values are updated on both sides.
1.2.1 Some Practical Motivations for theGUMAP Protocols
There is a significant di erence that distinguishes the GUMAP protocols
from RAPP : the fact that RAPP has only one triplet ID, k1 and k2, and
not two. This is an important point because it arose from a necessity, in fact
soon after the pubblication of RAPP , a simple desynchronization attack was
published (recall the quote from the SLAP authors in section 1.1 ). Altough
the protocol presented this great vulnerability, its global structure seemed
to be interesting to the other authors, which decided to try to upgrade it
without reinventing protocols from scratch. To overcome this vulnerability,
the creators of the GUMAP protocols decided to store each time not only
the new triplet of generated values, but also the old one, adding the triplet:
1.2. THE GUMAP PROTOCOLS 11
kold1 , kold2 and IDold to the set of stored values.
Let’s see what are the e ects of this change: we said that the vulnerability
of RAPP allows us a desynchronization attack, that is, only the triplet of
values on the Tag (or that on the Reader) is modified, and so the two devices
cannot communicate anymore (the various kinds of attack will be described
with more details in section 2.3 ). Let’s suppose that we want to try to do
the same attack on a GUMAP protocol, so we update the values stored on
the Tag, but the values on the Reader stays the same. At this point, the
Tag contains the triplets (knew1 , knew2 , IDnew), (knew
Õ
1 , knew
Õ
2 , IDnewÕ), while
the Reader contains (kold1 , kold2 , IDold), (knew1 , knew2 , IDnew). When they’ll
try to communicate, the Reader will send the HELLO message to the Tag,
which will send back IDnewÕ , that is unknown to the Reader. At this point,
the Reader will send another HELLO to the Tag, that, this time, will send
its IDnew. After this, the Reader knows the ID, and so the communication
can happen. This is the proof that they’ve not been desynchronized.
1.2.2 The SLAP Protocol
The SLAP protocol was proposed by Luo, Su and Huang in 2016, and it is
one of the so called GUMAP protocols. The name SLAP stands for Succint
and Lightweight Authentication P rotocol. Let’s start by defining the op-
erations used by the protocol: the first operation, very common in Ultra-
Lightweight protocols, is the function Rotation(a, b) (or simply Rot(a, b)).
This function is really simple: it takes as input two strings and computes a
circular left shift of the first, where the number of positions being shifted,
corresponds to the Hamming Weight of the second. The Rotation func-
tion works in the following way: suppose that a = an≠1an≠2 · ·a1a0 is a
binary string and we want to compute Rot(a, b): first of all, we compute
wt(b) = k, then we divide a into the two substrings a1 = an≠1 · ·an≠k≠1 and
a2 = an≠k≠2 · ·a0, we have Rot(a, b) = a2a1. Later in the text, we’ll find very
often the expression Rot(a): it simply stands for Rot(a, a), so the string a
is rotated by a number of positions equals to its own Hamming Weight.
The second function used during the protocol, is the function Conversion(a,
b). It has been defined by the authors of the protocol, and it’s not so easy
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to explain, so we’ll dedicate all the next section to it. For now, it’s enough
to know that this function takes as input two strings of the same length,
and a fixed value Treshold; from this input, the function computes a third
string (with the same length of a and b) with the aim that the output string
seems as much random as possible.
The following schema represents the phases of the protocol and shows how
the various values are computed:
A = Con(knew1 , knew2 )ü n
B = Con(Rot(knew1 , n), knew1 ü knew2 )üRot(Con(knew2 , knew2 ü n), knew1 )
C = Con(Con(B, knew1 ), Con(knew1 , knew2 ü n))ü ID
knew1 = Con(k1, n)ü k2
knew2 = Con(k2, B)ü k1
IDnew = Con(ID, nü (BÕÕLorR||C ÕÕLorR))
Reader
IDi, IDi+1
Reader
IDi+1, IDi+2
Tag
IDi, IDi+1
Tag
IDi+1, IDi+2
R THELLO
R T
IDi+1
R T
A||BLorR
R T
CLorR
Figure 1.1: The SLAP Protocol
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Now, let’s start with the protocol: at first, like the other GUMAP
protocols, both the Reader and the Tag know the values IDnew, IDold,
knew1 , knew2 , kold1 and kold2 . These are the steps of the protocol:
1. The Reader sends an HELLO message to the Tag. This message
doesn’t contain any information.
R THELLO
2. The Tag sends its IDnew to the Reader.
R T
IDnew
3. The Reader tries to fetch from the Database the keys associated with
the recived ID: if it succeeds, it skips to the next point. If the Reader
is not able to retrieve the keys the first time, it sends another HELLO
to the Tag: this time the Tag will send its IDold to the Reader, and,
if the Reader finds a match in the Database, the protocol continues,
otherwise, it is aborted. From now on, we’ll assume that the commu-
nication succeeds the first time, and so we assume that the devices
use IDnew, knew1 and knew2 : so the only di erence with the other sit-
uation is the name of the variables used (to be more specific, during
the second attempt, the devices try to use the values IDold, kold1 and
kold2 ).
4. The Reader generates a random number n, and it uses this three values
to compute two strings: the first string is
A = Conv(knew1 , knew2 )ü n
and the second String is
B = Conv(Rot(knew1 , n), knew1 üknew2 )üRot(Conv(knew2 , knew2 ün), knew1 )
At this point, the Reader sends to the Tag the messages A, and BR/BL
(where BR indicates the right half of B and BL the left half), depend-
ing on if the Hamming Weight of B is even or odd (if it’s even it sends
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BR and vice-versa).
R T
A, BR/BL
5. Once it has received A and BR/BL, the Tag extracts n from A, by
computing Conv(knew1 , knew2 ) and by xoring this value with A. Im-
mediately afterwards, the Tag uses n to compute B and so BR/BL;
then, it compares the value with the received one, and, if both the
values are equals, then the Tag computes a series of new values (ID,
k1 and k2) and updates its content by storing the values IDnew, knew1
and knew2 as IDold, kold1 and kold2 ; and the newly computed values as
IDnew, knew1 and knew2 . If the value that the Tag received is di erent
from the one that it calculated, then the protocol is aborted.
6. At this point, the values on the Tag are di erent from the values on
the Reader; so it is necessary to update them in the same way. So the
Tag computes a value
C = Con(Con(B, knew1 ), Con(knew1 , knew2 ü n))ü ID
and it sends the half of C, CL/CR with the same logic it has used for
B.
R T
CR/CL
When it receives this last value, the Reader uses the same formula to
compute its own C. Then, if the two values are equals, even the triplet
on the Reader is updated, otherwise, the two stored triplets stays the
ame as before.
1.2.3 The Conversion Function
One of the strengths of the SLAP protocol is the Conversion function. This
function takes as input two strings of fixed length, a fixed value Treshold,
and computes an output value whose aim is to seem as much random as
possible.
1.2. THE GUMAP PROTOCOLS 15
Let’s see how it works:
Let’s suppose that the length of the two input strings is fixed to 32, and that
the Treshold value is set to T = 6. Conversion takes as input two binary
strings A = a31a30 · · · a1a0 and B = b31b30 · · · b1b0 (it is important to notice
that the bits are numbered in decreasing order, from the left to the right),
then, the function consists of three phases:
1. Grouping: In this phase, each string is recursively splitted into sev-
eral substrings, each of which has to be smaller than T , depending on
its Hamming Weight. Here is an example: suppose A = a31a30 · · ·a1a0
and wt(A) = 20, then A is splitted into A1 and A2 where A1 =
a20a19 · · ·a1a0 and A2 = a31a1930 · · ·a22a21, and so length(A1) = wt(A)
and length(A2) = length(A)≠wt(A). This is done recursively for each
substring until each of them has length smaller or equal than T . The
same is done with B. The output of this phase is an ordered set of
substrings for each one of the two input strings.
2. Rearrange: In this second phase, we use the divisions that we com-
puted on one string to split the other, in other words, we exchange
the divisions. Here is an example: suppose that the output of the
previous phase is A = (a31 · ·a28)(a27 · ·a23)(a22 · ·a17) · · · ·(a3 · ·a0),
B = (b31 · ·b27)(b26 · ·b25)(b24 · ·b19) · · · ·(b4 · ·b0), then we exchange
this groups from A to B and from B to A, in the following way:
A = (a31 · ·a27)(a26 · ·a25)(a24 · ·a19) · · · ·(a4 · ·a0), B = (b31 · ·b28)(b27 ·
·b23)(b22 · ·b17) · · · ·(b3 · ·b0). After this operation, we apply on each
substring the function Rotation and we consider A and B as the con-
catenations of the corresponding lists of rotated substrings. Now we
have this two strings A and B, that are rearranged in a completely
di erent way, compared to the beginning.
3. Composition This is the third and last phase and it simply consists
in a xor between the new A and B resulting from the previous phase
(we can compute it since both the strings have equal length).
An explanation of this function in words may result not so clear, so, let’s
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see how it works by a practical example:
Let’s start by defining the input variables of the function:
A = 11101001010111100101011010011011
B = 101110010101001001010110111011000
T = 6
So it’s clear that we are using 32 bit-long strings. The first phase is Group-
ing, so we start by calculating wt(A), that is equal to 19. Now we split the
string A into the two substrings A1 and A2 so that A2 = a31 · ·a19 and A1 =
a18 · ·a0 (during this phase, it is important to remember that the characters
of the strings are numbered in decreasing order from the left to the right!).
So, in this case, A1 = 1100101011010011011 and A2 = 1110100101011. At
this point we have to measure the length of each substring, and, if it’s greater
than the treshold, then we need to split it again as we did before. As we can
easily notice, length(A1) = 19 > T , so we repeat the same thing that we did
for A: wt(A1) = 11, so A1 = A12A11 such that A12 = a18 · ·a11 and A12 =
a10 · ·a0, from that we get A12 = 11001010 and A11 = 11010011011. The
same thing happens with A2, because length(A2) = 13 > T ; once splitted,
A2 looks like that: A2 = A22A21 where A22 = 11101 and A21 = 00101011.
At this point, an interesting thing happened: we have A22 = 11101 such
that length(A22) Æ T , so we don’t need to split it anymore.
Let’s see where we are right now, we split A in the following way:
A = A22A21A12A11 = (11101)(00101011)(11001010)(11010011011)
now, since their length is greater than the treshold, we need to split again
all this substrings except A22.
The final result of this operation on A results in the following schema:
A = A22A212A211A122A121A112A1112A1111 =
= (11101)(0010)(1011)(1100)(1010)(1101)(001)(1011)
1.2. THE GUMAP PROTOCOLS 17
and, after doing the same thing for B we get this:
B = (101)(11001)(01010)(010)(0101)(0110)(1011)(1000).
The next phase is Rearrange: in this phase the first thing to do is to
exchange the schemes that we computed during the previous phase, so we
use on A the divisions that we computed on B, and on B the divisions that
we computed on A. In order to easily perform this task, we can simply count
the number of bits of each substring, for each input string of the function.
For A this list will be Adiv = [5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 4] (the first number of the list
is 5 because the length of the first substring of A, A22, is 5), and for the
same reasons, Bdiv = [3, 5, 5, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4]. Once we have this lists it is easy to
compute the new substrings-schemes: we start by fetching the first element
from Bdiv, in this case 3, and so we count the first 3 bits (from left to right)
in A: (111), this is now the new first substring of A. For the same reason,
the second block of A is (01001) and so on until we reach the end of the
string: at the end we have
A = (111)(01001)(01011)(110)(0101)(0110)(1001)(1011)
and
B = (10111)(0010)(1010)(0100)(1010)(1101)(011)(1000).
The second task that the Rearrange phase performs, is the circular left shift
of each substring through the Rotation function. Each substring w of the
input strings, is replaced by Rot(w).
After we replaced every substring by the rotated one, we have the following
configuration:
A = (111)(00101)(11010)(011)(0101)(1001)(0110)(1101)
and
B = (11011)(0100)(1010)(1000)(1010)(1110)(101)(0001).
We now use this two rearrangements of the strings to compute the final
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result of the function during the last phase: the Composition. This last
phase simply consists in a xor operation between the two outputs of the
previous phase. From this operation, we get that with T = 6, the final result
is:
Conv(A,B) = 00111111100001110000111000111100
1.3 Implementing The SLAP Protocol
In order to study the protocol, and find potential weaknesses, we may need
to do some statistical analysis on the values that the Tag and the Reader
exchange. Here, we propose a JAVA implementation of the protocol: by
this implementation, every kind of test we could need in the future would
be fairly easy to do.
1.3.1 Implementing The Conversion Function
The first thing to do, in order to implement the full protocol, is to imple-
ment the Conversion function. Here we have the code representing all the
operations executed in order to compute the outcome of the function:
public String Conversion(int treshold, String A, String B){
//GROUPING
ArrayList<Integer> A_Division = Utility.computeDivision(A, treshold);
ArrayList<Integer> B_Division = Utility.computeDivision(B, treshold);
//REARRANGE
ArrayList<String> rearrangeA = Utility.split(B_Division, A);
ArrayList<String> rearrangeB = Utility.split(A_Division, B);
rearrangeA = Utility.rotateAll(rearrangeA);
rearrangeB = Utility.rotateAll(rearrangeB);
String finalA = Utility.join(currentA);
String finalB = Utility.join(currentB);
//COMPOSITION
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return Utility.stringXOR(finalA, finalB);
}
The first thing to note, is the class Utility, which provides us with
all the lower level methods that we need (you can find the code for the
cited methods and others in the appendix). As we can see, for the Group-
ing phase, we need only the method computeDivision(String input, int
treshold). This is the most complicated method needed to implement Con-
version. The aim of this method is to compute all the indexes in which the
input string would be splitted, according to the rules of this phase. The
method works as follows: first of all, an empty array of integers is defined;
after that, it calls a recursive method that splits the input string into two
substrings, and recursively splits all the substrings until the length is smaller
or equal to the treshold. Once it finds a substring, whose length is not greater
than the treshold, it takes the indexes relative to the location of the sub-
string inside the first input strings, and checks if the indexes are inside the
array defined at the beginning: if the indexes aren’t in the array, then it adds
them, otherwise, if they already are in the array, the method doesn’t insert
them again. It is necessary to check if an index has already been inserted,
because, except for the indexes 0 and 32 (if the input string consists of 32
bits), the method would try to insert every index two times: once because
it would be the last index of a substring, and another time because it would
be the first of the following substring. The code for the computeDivision
method is the following:
public ArrayList<Integer> computeDivision(String input, int treshold){
ArrayList<Integer> target = new ArrayList<>();
Utility.computeDivisionAux(target, input, 0, input.length(),
treshold);
return target;
}
private static void computeDivisionAux(ArrayList<Integer> target,
String input, int begin, int len, int treshold){
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if( (len - begin) <= treshold){
if(!target.contains(begin))
target.add(begin);
if(!target.contains(len))
target.add(len);
return;
}
int w = Utility.getHammingWeight( input.substring(begin, len));
Utility.computeDivisionAux(target, input begin, len - w, treshold);
Utility.computeDivisionAux(target, input, len- w, len, treshold);
}
Once this phase is done, we need to perform the two tasks of the Re-
arrange phase, so we need to split the strings and to left-rotate all the
generated substrings. To split the strings, we implemented the method
split(ArrayList<Integer> indexes, String toSplit): it simply returns
an array containing all the substrings generated by splitting, at the indexes
indicated by the array, the input string toSplit. This method lets us split
the strings only once, because we can directly split a string based on the in-
dexes generated by the other one, so we don’t need to split them two times,
like one normally would do trying to calculate this function by hands. Once
splitted, in order to perform the second task of the Rearrange phase, we need
to replace each substring w with Rotation(w). This task is accomplished by
the method rotateAll(ArrayList<String> toRotate), that simply left-
rotates all the strings in the array by their Hamming Weight.
At this point we are almost done: the method join trivially concatenates
all the substrings together, according to the order in which the substrings
were inside the first string, and, eventually, the computexor method returns
the output of the third phase: the final result. As mentioned earlier, you
can find the code fot these methods (and others) in the appendix.
1.3.2 Calculating the messages
As we said, the Conversion function is the most complicated task of all
the implementation: once we implemented it, the messages will be fairly
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easy to compute. The first message to be computed by the Reader is
A = Conv(knew1 , knew2 ) ü n. From that formula we immediately obtain the
function:
public String computeA(String k1, String k2){
String n = Utility.getRandomString(k1.length());
String c = Conversion(k1, k2);
return Utility.StringXOR(c, n);
}
The only thing to note here is that the method public static String
getRandomString(int length) returns a random binary string of arbitrary
length.
The B message is much more complicated than A, but, again, at this point
we have all the necessary components and we only need to put them together.
Recall that B = Con(Rot(knew1 , n), knew1 ü knew2 ) ü Rot(Con(knew2 , knew2 ü
n), knew1 ). To have a more readable, organized, and maintainable code, we
divide B in the following way:
A = Rot(knew1 , n)
B = Con(knew2 , knew2 ü n)
C = Rot(Con(knew2 , knew2 ü n), knew1 ) = Rot(B, knew1 )
D = Con(Rot(knew1 , n), knew1 ü knew2 ) = Con(A, knew1 ü knew2 )
so that the result is trivially C ü D. We obtain the following code:
public String computeB(String K1, String K2, String n, int treshold){
String A = Utility.rotate(K1, getHammingWeight(n));
String B = Conversion(treshold, K2, Utility.stringXOR(K2, n));
String C = Utility.rotate(B, Utility.getHammingWeight(K1));
String D = Conversion(treshold, A, Utility.stringXOR(K1, K2));
return Utility.stringXOR(C, D);
}
The last message produced during the protocol is the message C, but,
we’ll not discuss an implementation of this message, since, as we’ll see in
the following chapters, this is completely useless to our purpose.
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Chapter 2
Attacking The SLAP
Protocol
Finding an attack to an authentication protocol of this kind, means to find
the possibility to do, within the protocol, something that the protocol itself
was built to deny. What if, for example, we find a way to update the values k1
and k2 on a Tag, from a device that is not the authorized Reader, preventing
them from communicate again? Of course we don’t want this to be possible,
otherwise, why do we care about a secure autentication protocol? The study
of this kind of protocols is necessary, in order to to be as safe as possible
that it’s impossible to do such things. So, for this kind of analysis, we need
to be able to think like an attacker, without forgetting our good purposes.
2.1 The Attacker’s Toolbox
The first necessary step, thinking like an attacker, is to be fully aware of
the set of tools that an attacker could use to try to break a protocol. It’s
obvious that, in order to think about the ways an attacker would break a
protocol, we need to embrace his power. The attacker-tools are basically
three, and they are the following:
1. Send: This is trivial, but it’s worth mentioning: an attacker can send
messages to the various devices involved in the protocol, in this case,
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the Reader, and the Tag.
2. Block: This is not so trivial: an attacker can block a message sent
from a device to another, preventing the second device to receiving it.
3. Eavesdrop: This is another powerful tool of which an attacker can
take advantage: it can eavesdrop the messages that the devices send
between them.
2.2 The Kinds of Attacks
There are various kinds of weaknesses, which can be found inside cryp-
tographic protocols. There are also various kinds of way to exploit these
weaknesses in order to attack a protocol. The ways to attack a protocol can
be slightly di erent, and they’re divided into several cathegories; here we
present the foundamentals:
1. Replay Attack: This kind of attack consists basically in eavesdrop-
ping some values during a communication, and replaying them, trying
to do other iterations of the protocol. Basically, referring to the SLAP
protocol, you can think of, for example, eavesdropping the messages
A and B sent from the Reader to the Tag, and send them to the Tag
again: in this case, nothing happens because the new values of knew1
and knew2 will be equal to the old values, and so they will be equal to
the values stored on the authorized reader... but that is not the same
for all the other protocols.
2. De-synchronization Attack: This kind of attack is one of the most
common. It consists in de-synchronizing one device from the other,
so that the two devices won’t be able to communicate again. To be
more clear, referring to the SLAP protocol, a desynchronization attack
would consist of a way to update the keys only to the Tag’s side, so
that the reader wouldn’t be able to authenticate it anymore.
3. Full-Disclosure Attack: An attack is a full-disclosure attack when
it lets us retrieve the secret values held by the various devices involved
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in the protocol. As before, thinking about the SLAP protocol, a full-
disclosure attack would be an attack that, in some way, would let us
recover k1 and/or k2.
4. Impersonification Attack: An impersonification attack is an attack
in which the attacker pretends to be one of the devices involved in the
protocol, and manages to carry out some operations that only the
authentic device is supposed to execute.
2.3 An Attack to the GUMAP Protocols
In 2016 Safkhani and Bagheri [5] proposed a generalized desynchronization
attack to the suit of the GUMAP protocols. This attack revealed some
vulnerabilities in the common structure of all the GUMAP protocols, and,
it was so important because, for a subset of protocols including SLAP , it
was the first attack being published. Now we’ll explain this attack with a
pratical example of how it would work on SLAP .
Firstly, we assume that both the Reader and the Tag stores the two
triplets of values (kn≠11 , kn≠12 , IDn≠1) = (kold1 , kold2 , IDold) and (kn1 , kn2 ,
IDn) = (knew1 , knew2 , IDnew). Let’s see the steps for the attack:
Session 1: the Tag and the Reader complete a session of the protocol.
In order to do that, they have to send the values IDn, An and Bn
through the insecure channel, so we eavesdrop and store them.
R T
R T
R T
R T
HELLO
IDn
A0, B0
C0
At the end of this session, the two triplets on both sides will be (kn1 ,
kn2 , IDn) and (kn+11 , kn+12 , IDn+1).
Session 2: the Reader and the Tag complete the first steps of the
protocol, until the messages An+1 and Bn+1 are sent from the Reader
to the Tag: at this point, we eavesdrop all the values (IDn+1, An+1 and
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Bn+1), and block An+1 and Bn+1, preventing the Tag from receiving
it.
R T
R T
R T// A
HELLO
IDn+1
A1, B1
Since we blocked the communication, the protocol is not completed,
and the values on Tag and Reader stays the same as before.
Session 3: the Reader sends an HELLO message to the Tag, that
sends back the value IDn+1. At this point, we block the message
sent by the Tag, and we send to the Reader (which is waiting for the
ID) a random number. Since the Reader could not find a stored ID
corresponding to the random number, it will send another HELLO
to the Tag, which will respond with IDn. At this point the protocol
continues and both the devices will update their stored values.
R T
R T
R T
R T
HELLOX2
IDn
A2, B2
C2
At the end of this session the values (kn+11 , kn+12 , IDn+1) are replaced
with (kn+21 , kn+22 , IDn+2). It is important to notice, that, in this case,
the triplet new has been replaced with the new computed values, but
the triplet old hasn’t been modified.
Session 4: during this session we send two HELLO messages to the
Tag, in order to let it send us the value IDn. Once it sent the value,
we send to the Tag the values A0 and B0 that we eavesdropped during
session 1.
A T
A T
A T
A T
HELLOX2
IDn
A0, B0
C0
At this point, the Reader contains the two triplets (kn1 , kn2 , IDn) and
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(kn+21 , kn+22 , IDn+2); while the first triplet of the Tag has been modi-
fied. The Tag now stores (kn1 , kn2 , IDn) and (kn+11 , kn+12 , IDn+1).
Session 5: we impersonate again the reader, and send the HELLO to
the Tag. This time, it will send IDn+1 (because it is its IDnew). Now
we send A1 and B1 that we blocked during session 2, we can because
the authorized reader computed that values starting from IDn+1.
A T
A T
A T
A T
HELLO
IDn+1
A1, B1
C1
At the end of this session, the two triplets on the Reader are still
(kn1 , kn2 , IDn) and (kn+21 , kn+22 , IDn+2), but the triplets on the Tag
are (kn+11 , kn+12 , IDn+1) and (kn+31 , kn+32 , IDn+3). It is easy to see
that there isn’t one common triplet stored on both devices, and so we
desynchronized them.
2.4 Finding Vulnerabilities in SLAP
At this point, the functioning of the protocol has been explained in a great
detail, furthermore, we also know some important weaknesses that let us
understand the protocol even more deeply. With this understanding of the
protocol, we are ready to look at it like an attacker would do. Since we
have already seen an attack that only exploits a vulnerability inherent to
the structure of the mechanism of IDs and keys updating, we will focus our
attention on the other parts of the protocol, because our aim is to find new
vulnerabilities.
2.4.1 Analysis of the Conversion function
As we said, the Conversion function is one of the main strengths of SLAP ,
so, finding a vulnerability in it would be a great starting point in order to
carry out an attack on the protocol.
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2.4.1.1 Inverting the function
If we consider input strings of 32 bits, the number of possible outcomes is
Æ 232, while, the number of the possible input couples, is roughly 232 ◊ 232.
From this observation, we can easily conclude that, for nearly every outcome
of the function, there is a group of input strings that produces it. If A, B, C
and D are four strings of 32 bits, and Con(A,B) = Con(C,D), we say that
there is a collision between these two inputs and, since Conversion allows
collisions, we are sure that it is almost impossible to invert it. However, we
can find a way to generate a couple of strings that produce a certain fixed
output. The key observation is the following: suppose that A is a 32 bits
string, for example:
A = 01010111001000101111011010110010
and B is a string of the following form:
B = 1000000000000000000000000000000
what happens if we try to compute Conv(A,B) ?
Well, let’s compute the outcome step-by-step: during the first phase
(grouping), the string B will generate the following splitting-schema:
B = |100000|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|
This schema will then be applied to the string A during the second phase
(rearrange), so, only the six leftmost bits of A will be rotated.
Regarding the string B, it will be splitted according to the splitting
schema generated by A, but, we only need to consider what happens in
the leftmost block: in fact, except for the only 1 in the string, B is only
composed by 0s, and so if we pick up a block that is composed by all zeros,
they won’t be rotated. In this case, the splitting schema generated by A is
the following:
A = |010|10111|00100|01|01|11101|10101|10010|
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From this divisions, we can compute the output of the second phase
(rearrange):
A = 10101011001000101111011010110010
B = 0010000000000000000000000000000
At this point, only the third phase (composition) is left, but we can
easily conclude that the final result is:
Conv(A,B) = 10001011001000101111011010110010
We can observe that this result has an important characteristics: except
for the six leftmost bits, it is identical to the string A. With some little
changes, we can exploit this strange situation in order to produce, for every
output R, two strings A and B such that Conv(A,B) = R.
We just saw that, if we act like in the previous example, no matter how
we pick up the A string, the outcome will di er from it (at most) for the six
leftmost bits, both because these bits will be rotated during rhe rearrange,
and because there will be the 1 in the B string that will complement a bit in
that area of A. First of all, suppose we know that, after the rearrange phase,
the only 1 in B would be the leftmost bit of the string: if we complement
the leftmost bit of A, we would neutralize the modification of A during the
composition phase. As regards the rotation of the bits, we can easily avoid
this problem because we already know the size of the block that would be
rotated (and of course we know the Hamming Weight of the block). Since
we have got these information, we can rotate the block to the right, by its
Hamming Weight: in this way, the function will rotate back the block by
the same number of positions to the left during the rearrange, recomposing
it as it was before. After these two modifications, this is how A looks like:
A = 01011111001000101111011010110010
Now, since we have supposed that the only 1 in B is the leftmost bit
during the composition phase, we can use the same method we used for A,
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to ensure that this happens: first of all we have to compute the size of the
leftmost block of A (as it is now):
A = 01|01111|1001000|101111011010110010
with this information, we know that the leftmost block of B is |10| and we
can rotate it by one position to the right, obtaining our final B string that
looks like that:
B = 0100000000000000000000000000000
In order to check if we suceeded, let’s compute the output of Conv(A,B).
This is the output of the grouping phase:
A = |01|01111|10010|00|10|11110|11010|110010|
B = 010000|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0
this is the output of the rearrange phase:
A = 110101|11001000101111011010110010
B = 10|00000000000000000000000000000
and finally we have the output of composition:
Conv(A,B) = 01010111001000101111011010110010
As we expected, the result corresponds to the string A that we picked
at the beginning.
There could be many variations of this process, nevertheless, the procedure
that we just saw, is the easiest one. The number of 1s of the string B can
be di erent from one: in fact, it only has to be Æ 4 (assuming that we have
a treshold Ø 4). For example, by our setting, we could have picked up a
string B = 11100000...000. When we choose a B string with more than one
1, things gets much trickier, in fact, the output of the grouping phase of the
B string that we picked as an example would be:
|11100|000|000|000|000|000|000|000|000|000|
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this means that the string A woult be splitted into several blocks of three
bits (except for the leftmost block) instead of blocks of only one bit, so,
during the rearrange phase, these bits would be rotated. We can avoid this
problem by rotating all the 3-bits blocks to the right, as we did before for
the other blocks, the rest of the process stays the same, except for the fact
that, this time, we (of course) have to complement the three leftmost bits
in A.
The reason why we cannot use a string with more than four ones is not
so straightforward. Suppose we want to pick up a B string with five 1s, here
we have the related division-schema:
B = |11|11100|00000|00000|00000|00000|00000|
and suppose that, we have a certain string A such that its division schema,
transposed on B, looks like that:
B = |11|111000|000000000000000000000000|
according to our algorithm, we have to right-rotate the blocks, but, here’s
what happens: once that the bits have been rotated, the division-schema
generated by the string changes!
B = |110|0011|10000|00000|00000|00000|00000|
so, if we use a string with five or more 1s, the division-schema generated
by B after the right-rotation could change in an unpredictable way, and for
this reason we cannot use such strings.
2.4.1.2 Analysing collisions
Since we now know that it is impossible to invert Conversion, but we have a
powerful algorithm to generate collisions (and we know that there are many
couples of input strings that generate every output), we could wonder if
these couples of input strings are related in some way.
In order to investigate along this path, we carried out some experiments.
The first esperiment was the most natural for this purpose: we found some
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collisions and we looked for similarities among the couple of input strings.
Here we have an example of collision:
input couple 1:
A1 = 10011011001011000111000011011111
B1 = 11110100101111100000011000011101
input couple 2:
A2 = 10100110011110101111100101111101
B2 = 00101000011111010101010111100001
final result:
R = 10010100001110011010000001111000
Like in this case, we had to look for some common features between the cou-
ples: since at first glance we couldn’t identify noticeable similarities, we tried
to consider some specific parameters. As parameters, we chose to evaluate
the same parameters considered by the function itself: Hamming Weight
and locations of di erent bits. Let’s take a look to the Hamming Weights of
these strings: wt(A1) = 18, wt(B1) = 21, wt(A2) = 17, wt(B2) = 16. From
this comparison, we cannot identify noticeable similarities. Another inter-
esting comparison consisted of locating the di erences between members of
the first couple and members of the second couple, here is an example:
A1 = 10011011001011000111000011011111
B2 = 00101000011111010101010111100001
XOR1 = 10110011010100010010010100111110
We have tried to analyse the di erences between all possible pairing of
strings for every collision and we have tried this experiment on 100 collisions.
Unfortunately, this experiment hasn’t revealed something of interesting.
Another idea, has been to fix two strings A and B, and try to apply little
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changes to them, in order to check if we could obtain some strings AÕ and
BÕ such that Conv(A,B) = Conv(AÕ, BÕ). The goal was the same of section
2.4.1.1, but, this time, we used A and B as our starting point, instead of us-
ing the result. Starting from this idea we designed two similar experiments:
in the first experiment, we changed a single bit in A, and we computed
Conversion by flipping each time a di erent bit in B. We repeated this for
every bit in A, in order to check all possible combinations of one flipped bit
in A and one flipped bit in B. The second experiment prescribed to do the
same thing, but each time flipping two bits in A and two bits in B, in all
possible ways. From a practical point of view, this was an ine cient proce-
dure, but it was feasible for strings of 32 bits (it was almost impracticable
for strings of 96 bits, since it would require
!96
2
"◊ !962 " trials), but, we were
interested in finding vulnerabilities, and this was just a procedure that could
have given us a starting point.
After the execution of both tests, the results said us that, in both cases,
the probability to get a collision in this way is ¥ 0.5%. It is a very dis-
couraging result and it definitely told us that this was not the right place
to look for vulnerabilities, even though, we can move forward with a deeper
understanding of Conversion.
2.4.1.3 How one-bit flip a ects the output of Conversion
In the previous section we realized that, starting from some input strings,
it is almost impossible to generate a collision. This phenomenon is not acci-
dental: it relies on the cryptographic properties of di usion and confusion.
These two properties indicate the fact that, for a certain cryptographic func-
tion f , no matter how two inputs x1 and x2 are similar, f(x1) and f(x2)
have to show no relations at all between them: they have to seem randomly
picked from the set of the possible outputs. The results of the previous
experiments suggested that the creators of SLAP have succesfully built a
function with these characteristics. Anyway, the tests that we carried out
before were too specific. Starting directly from the definition of di usion
and confusion, we designed a test that is specific for this purpose. The test
consisted in the following steps: we chose two random strings A and B.
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At first, we computed the output string r = Conv(A,B). After that, we
randomly selected a bit in A, we flipped it and we called the so obtained
string AÕ. Again, we computed rÕ = Conv(AÕ, B), and we analysed the dif-
ferences between r and rÕ in terms of how many bits changed, and where
this di erent bits were located. As a second step, we obtained the string AÕÕ
by flipping one randomly selected bit inside AÕ, making sure that AÕÕ ”= A.
At this point, we computed rÕÕ = Conv(AÕÕ, B) and we compared the two
strings rÕ and rÕÕ. We repeated this test for 100’000 iterations on input of
32 bits and treshold = 6.
The diagram below shows the frequency of the number of bits that changed
between one output and its next: for example, in the 6.40% of the cases,
the number of di erent bits between one output and its next was 5.
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Already at a first glance, there is an important information that we can no-
tice: the number of di erences is always odd. This seems to be a structural
characteristic of the function, and it seems the most important information
that we can get from these results. Furthermore, as we can see from the
diagram, the number of di erences between one output and the next fol-
lows approximately a bell curve. This indicates that, under this aspect, the
Conversion function shows a good behavior, in fact, the number of di er-
ences that we get each time follows an apparently random trend: even under
this aspect, Conversion seems to show that the properties of confusion and
diffusion have been well implemented.
Regarding the positions of this di erent bits, their behavior seems to be
completely random, and it doesn’t let us make any assumption.
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2.4.1.4 How 2-bits filp a ects the output of Conversion
This test was very similar to the previous, but, this time, instead of flipping
one single bit per iteration, we flipped two. Even this time, the positions of
the bits to flip was randomly selected in A, and, of course, we made sure
that each time AÕÕ ”= A.
As we did for the previous experiment, we summarized the results in a
diagram:
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Even this time, we can immediately notice something interesting: the num-
ber of di erences is always even. In the case of the previous experiment, we
were modifying the Hamming-Weight of the string by an odd factor, and
the di erences between the outputs were odd; in this case, the modification
of the H-W has been by an even number of bits, and it resulted in an even
number of di erent bits between the outputs. As soon as we noticed this
pattern, we repeated the same experiment for modifications of 3 and 4 bits,
in order to check if the outcomes would still present it. As we expected,
the outcomes presented the same pattern, so, it appears reasonable to us to
assume that it is generally true for every nomber of modified bits.
Another observation that we can make is that, in this case, even though
we can still identify a sort of bell curve, it is slightly shifted to the left.
We conducted a deeper analysis, taking into account even the positions of
the flipped bits, and the positions of the di erent bits in the output. We
could notice that there was a strange (and probably unexpected) behavior
of the function: when the flipped bits were both located at an extreme of
the string, say, the first six or the last six positions, and the two flipped
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bits were di erent from each other, the number of di erences between the
two results dramaticly decreased. We repeated the same experiment with
di erent configurations of string length and values of the treshold param-
eter, flipping couples of two di erent bits both within the first of last six
positions of A in every possible way. The four tables of the following page
summarizes the result.
From a theoretical point of view, this happened because if the bits were
flipped at an extreme side, and the weight of the string was the same as
before (and this is the reason why we wanted the two bits to be di erent),
with great probability the division’s schema generated during the rearrange
phase wouldn’t change, so the changes would have an impact only on the
specific block in which the modified bits were located.
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How 2-bits filp a ects the output of Conversion:
Table 2.1: treshold = 6
#Di erent bits Frequency
2 37%
4 10%
6 7%
8 7.5%
Table 2.2: treshold = 7
#Di erent bits Frequency
2 40%
4 6.9%
6 5.8%
8 6.42%
Table 2.3: treshold = 8
#Di erent bits Frequency
2 40.2%
4 6.85%
6 5.95%
8 6.56%
Table 2.4: treshold = 10
#Di erent bits Frequency
2 45.4%
4 1.45%
6 3.6%
8 6.1%
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2.4.2 Tests on the values A and B
We noticed from the tests that we carried out on the Conversion function
that, if we modify the inputs in some particular points, the consequences of
the modifications on the output are minimized. Starting from this observa-
tion, we conducted some tests on the values that the Tag and the Reader
exchange, in order to see how this strange phenomenon a ected them. First
of all, let’s recall how the values A and B are computed:
A = Conv(knew1 , knew2 )ü n
B = Conv(Rot(knew1 , n), knew1 ü knew2 )üRot(Conv(knew2 , knew2 ü n), knew1 )
As we can notice from the description of the protocol, the value A is only
used to hide the random number n, that will be used by the Tag in order
to compute the new IDs. A more subtle observation is that, if we send a
modified A to the Tag, our changes would only a ect n, because the Tag
already knows Conv(knew1 , knew2 ), and it will retrieve n by simply xoring
this value with A. Let’s now suppose that we send a modified A to the Tag:
how will the changes we made in n a ect the B value computed by the Tag?
Even though B is calculated in a deliberately complex way, this doesn’t
prevent us from doing a simple theoretical analysis. There are two points
in which n is used in order to compute B: the first is Rot(knew1 , n), and
the second is Conv(knew2 , knew2 ü n). In our previous tests on Conversion,
we observed that in order to get an output that has the smallest number
of di erences compared to the output obtained without modifications, a
good idea is to modify the input in two bits, that are one di erent from the
other, in this way Hamming Weight will stay the same. The situation is
similar for B, because one of the two expressions in which n in involved is
Rot(knew1 , n): in this situation, if the weight of n stays the same, the result
of the expressions won’t be modified at all.
As regards the second situation in which n is used, Conv(knew2 , knew2 ün),
it is pretty much the same: if we modify two input bits located at an extreme
side of the input of Conv, we can expect its output to be pretty similar to the
output we would get without the changes, except for a very small amount
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of bits located at such side. In order to understand if our analysis is correct,
we conducted some practical tests on the values A and B as we did for
Conversion.
2.4.2.1 How 2 bits-flip in n a ects B
For our first tests, although we took into account our previous considera-
tions, we tried to be as more general as possible. The first test has been
carried out in this way: we generated a random suit of all the necessary
values: k1, k2 and n, and then, starting from them, we computed a first B
value. After we computed the first B, we flipped a couple of bits in n, we
generated a new value BÕ and we evaluated the di erences between B and
BÕ as we did for Conversion. We repeated this test for all possible couples
of bit in n. There is an important di erence between this test and the ones
regarding Conversion: in this case, every value BÕ has been compared to
the first B: a comparison between two values BÕ1 and BÕ2 would have made
no sense.
At his point, it is important to recall that not all B is sent to the Tag:
once that the value has been computed, its Hamming Weight is evaluated
and then, if it is even, the right half of B is sent to the Tag, while, if it is
odd, the Reader sends to the Tag the left one, so, at the end, we will make
considerations only on half of the string. We generated ten di erent suits of
values k1, k2 and n, and performed the test on all of them.
The following diagram shows a mean of the results of the ten tests:
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Let’s analyse what these numbers means. First of all, we can notice an in-
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teresting and probably expected behaviour: as it happens for conversion,
when we modify two bits in the input (in this case n), the output is modified
by an even number of bits. A second observation that could be quite inter-
esting is that, in none of the ten tests, even flipping two bits in all possible
ways, we didn’t found any collision: neither one!
In this case, to analyse only these aspects, such as the number of di erent
bits, and their positions, would be reductive. As we said, the B value that
is evaluated on the Tag is only half of the entire value, and which half
will be sent depends on the Hamming Weight of the entire string B, so,
the Hamming Weight is an important factor and we need to consider it.
Looking at how the Hamming Weight of these outputs changes, we noticed
something interesting: it always varies for an even factor! This is so much
interesting because, if we have a value A and its associated BL/R we are
sure that, if we modify A in exactly two points, and we send it to the Tag,
the Tag will compute B and choose the same half (left or right) that the
Reader chose.
2.4.2.2 How changes in n a ects BR/L
At this point, we already have some important information on the way
certain changes in n impact the final result B: if we modify n in exactly two
points, the new B value will di er from an even number of bits, and also
the di erences between the two Hamming Weights will be even, so the half
of B that will be sent/evaluated won’t change. These information tells us
that the brief theoretical analysis that we presented before was right. The
last implication of that general analysis was that, if we modify two bits at
an extreme of n, the number of di erences will be minimized.
This time we repeated the test, but, instead of fixing the B value, we fixed
only the corresponding half. As before, we flipped every possible couple of
bits inside n, and each time we compared the output of the iteration with
the ”original” half of B that we fixed at the beginning. We repeated the
same test for ten suits of k1, k2 and n, and then we computed a mean of the
results. Here we present, in the usual way, the results:
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Probably, the most interesting result from these data, is the fact that there
is a certain number of cases, about the 4.1%, in which there is a collision,
that is, BÕR/L (the one generated with the modified n) and BR/L are equals.
This sort of behavior is certainly unintended: it tells us that, in certain
cases, if we eavestrop a session, and we send a couple of values AÕ and B,
there is a probability that the Tag will autenticate us. It is true that the
4.1% of probability is too low for a practical purpose, however, this is a good
starting point.
This diagram looks very similar to the diagram in section 2.4.1.4, it is
”shifted to the left”. Looking at the sequence of values BÕL/R generated
by the software that performed our test, we immediately noticed that there
was a good number of collisions in correspondence of the very first or very
last indexes. Considering that the cases of collisions were just a few, com-
pared to the length of the sequence of B values, the fact that there was
a good amount of collisions located at some specific indexes, was a strong
indication. And this was what we were expecting based on our previous
observations.
2.4.3 Looking for collisions in BR/L
Knowing that there are some collisions, our aim was to locate them with
the utmost possible precision. As usual, we selected a suit of k1, k2 and n,
and we computed BR/L. Secondly, we selected a couple of bits from the first
six or the last six positions of the string n, we flipped them, and then we
computed a new value BÕR/L. We did the same thing for all possible couples
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of bits in the first six or in the last six positions of n, and each time we
compared the output value with the first one.
We repeated this experiment for 100.000 sets of k1, k2 and n, for many
configurations of string length and value of the treshold parameter. The
table on the next page shows the results.
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Looking for collisions in BR/L:
string length treshold collision found
32 6 83.42%
32 7 83.2%
32 8 83.5%
32 10 84.62%
96 6 64.04%
96 7 64.05%
96 8 63.81%
96 10 61.82%
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2.5 An impersonification attack to the SLAP pro-
tocol
Thanks to the results we obtained in the last sections, we are now able to
carry out an impersonification attack to SLAP (remember that we defined
this knid of attack in section 2.2 ). Through this attack, we will be able to
carry out an unhautorized session of the protocol, and hence the Tag will
update one of its triplets of values.
The figure 2.1 summarizes the steps needed in order to carry out the attack:
the first step is to eavesdrop a regular session between Tag and Reader; in
particular, we are interested in the values A and BLorR. Starting from the
eavesdropped A, we compute a value AÕ by selecting two di erent bits, both
located within the first six positions or whitin the last six positions of the
string, and fliping their values, as we did for our last tests. As we know,
for certain values of AÕ, the corresponding value BLorR computed by the
Tag will be the same of the previous session. Therefore, if we choose the
right AÕ, and we send the pair AÕ≠BLorR to the Tag, it will authenticate us
and update its triplet (IDnew, knew1 , knew2 ) with a new set of values that is
completely unknown to the authorized Reader. We need a few attempts in
order to guess the right AÕ, but, once we guessed it, the Tag will notify us
by sending CLorR, which is the proof that the session has been succesfully
completed. If we try all the possible AÕ, that means
!6
2
" ◊ 2 = 30 total
attempts, the overall probability of success is the same of the experiment of
section 2.4.3, so, it is between 63-73% (for each authorized session that we
eavesdrop) depending on the combination of string length and treshold.
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An impersonification attack to the SLAP protocol:
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Figure 2.1: An impersonification attack to SLAP
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2.5.1 Details for an e cient implementation
2.5.1.1 Reducing the number of attempts
Due to the Ultra-Lightweight nature of this protocol (and therefore to the
poor computational power of the Tags), we should try to use as less attempts
as possible, in order to choose the right AÕ. First of all, flipping bits that
are exactly located in the first (or the last) six positions is useful because,
if we reduce this number of positions to five, our success rate falls down
by about 10%, in case of 32-bits inputs, and by about 5.5% in case of 96
bits input (but we reduce the number of attempts to
!5
2
" ◊ 2 = 20). On
the other hand, if we increase the positions to flip by another, the success
rate only grows by about 2.5%, in case of 32-bit inputs, and by 1.5% in
case of 96 bits input (but the number of attempts becomes
!7
2
" ◊ 2 = 42).
For a protocol of this kind, our 30 attempts are still too much. Here we
try to reduce them to a feasible number, but trying to maintain the highest
possible success rate. Firstly we can assume that the half of B that is sent
to the Tag is always BR (i.e. the weight of B is always even). This happens
only in 12 of the cases, but we reduce the number of attempts to 15. Since
we reduced the number of attempts, the success-rate will be reduced too,
Table 2.5 shows the success rate if we only flip bits in the left side of the
string. As a second step, we can try to identify if there are some flips that
have an higher success rate compared to others. In order to understand if
this intuition was right, we designed a simple test: we counted for each of
our 15 flips, how many matches it would generate on 500,000 sets of k1, k2
and n. As we can see from Table 2.6 of the following section, the success
rate of a flip is not random, as one could expect, but, it follows a roughly
defined classification, that is not a ected very much from the length of the
strings or from the value of treshold. Now that we know that there are
some flips that have a relatively low success-rate, we can try to avoid them,
further reducing the number of attempts required. If we exclude the last 5
attempts (0-5, 2-4, 1-5, 3-5, 2-5) the probability of Table 2.5 reduces by 3%
in each case: this is not so bad, because we reduced the attempts required
to 10, and we still have a success rate of about 44%.
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Reducing the number of attempts:
String length Treshold Success rate
32 6 47%
32 7 47.7%
32 8 48.12%
32 10 48.22%
96 6 47.33%
96 7 47.27%
96 8 48.22%
96 10 47.5%
Table 2.5: Success rate flipping only in
the first six positions from left.
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2.5.1.2 Choosing an e cient strategy
Since now we know that some flips have an higher probability to produce a
match, we can think of a strategy through which the various flips should be
tried. Here we present two trivial strategies, and a third one, that is based
on the classification in Table 2.6 that you can find on the next page. As we
can see, the five flips with the lowest probability have been excluded from
the strategy, for the reasons we presented in the previous section.
Strategy 1:
(0, 1)-(0, 2)-(0, 3)-(0, 4)-(1, 2)-(1, 3)-(1, 4)-(2, 3)-(3, 4)-(4, 5) average
attempts required = 3.95
Strategy 2:
(0, 1)-(1, 2)-(2, 3)-(3, 4)-(4, 5)-(0, 2)-(1, 3)-(0,3)-(1, 4)-(0,4) average
attempts required = 3.55
Strategy 3:
(0, 1)-(1, 2)-(0, 2)-(2, 3)-(4, 5)-(3, 4)-(1, 3)-(0, 3)-(0, 4)-(1, 4) average
attempts required = 3.45
As we expected, our best strategy performs better than the two trivial
ones, though, it doesn’t improve significantly the overall e cience of the
attack. From these data, we know that, with ¥ 44% probability, on average
we need only 3-4 attempts in order to succeed.
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Choosing an e cient strategy:
Flipped indexes success rate
0 1 11.7 %
1 2 10.8 %
0 2 10.7 %
2 3 10.3 %
4 5 10.2 %
3 4 10.2 %
1 3 10.0 %
0 3 9.9 %
0 4 9.5 %
1 4 9.4 %
0 5 9.3 %
2 4 9.1 %
1 5 9.0 %
3 5 8.8 %
2 5 8.7 %
Table 2.6: Absolute success rate
of the single flips.
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2.5.2 Considerations about the attack
The result that we obtain with¥ 44% probability and few attempts, could be
easily achieved with one attempt and almost 100% probability by performing
the two following steps:
• eavesdropping the values A - BLorR sent by the Reader to the Tag and
blocking them.
• sending the eavesdropped values to the Tag.
By performing these two steps, we would let the Reader and The tag in the
same condition we would let them by performing our attack. Even though
this is absolutely true from a theoretical point of view, these two procedures
produce very di erent situations in practice. The strength of the proposed
impersonification attack, lays in the fact that it could easily and e ectively
be used in practice: all we need to do is to eavesdrop a session. As regards
the procedure above, the situation is di erent because it requires to block a
session, and, in the real world, the person/device that is trying to carry out
a certain session will notice if the session has been blocked. Once noticed
that the session has been blocked, one could take some countermeasures, for
example, we could perform two consecutive sessions of the protocol, in this
way the set of values that the attacker could have used in order to carry out
the attack would disappear.
Even though there are many attack that from a theoretical point of view
are much more powerful than the one proposed in this work (for example
the desynchronization attack proposed by Safkhani and Bagheri [5]), they
require to eavesdrop and block more consecutive sessions, and this could be
not so easy in the real world, as it could seem on a piece of paper.
As regards the cryptographic property that this attack violates, it is the
Integrity. Quoting the authors of the protocol: ”...it is essential to ensure
the received random number in the tag side is the same as the random
number generated by the reader. For the sake of this goal, the messages
BLorR and CLorR not only provide the evidence for mutual authentication,
but also assure the integrity of the transmitted messages. For example, when
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a malicious adversary tries to modify n by flipping certain bits in A, it must
transfer the result of random number n which extracts from A by the tag.
Finally, the local computed message BÕ at tag side will be incorrect and lead
a failed authentication. [1]”
2.5.2.1 Possible fixes
In order to fix this vulnerability, we would need to spread the small changes
in n all along the string B. An expression that could help us to reach this
goal could be
F = Con(Rot(n,A), A)
This expression has some interesting characteristics: first of all, we know
that the value A, will di er from two bits (located at an extreme side) be-
tween the two sessions of the protocol involved in the attack. The same
thing happens with n, but, since we expect weight(A) ¥ length(n)2 , the mod-
ified bits would be shifted to an area of the string that certainly won’t be
an extreme side, by the expression Rot(n,A). It is important to notice that,
since the weight of n must stay the same for the attack to succeed, and we
cannot directly flip bits in A with this aim, in about half cases, when the
attack succeeds, the weight of A will be modified (and the Attacker won’t
be able to succeed, if he pretends that the weight of A stays the same, be-
cause his probability to succeed would decrease significantly). This is an
important property that could help us to make the protocol safer.
Even small changes in n would a ect in a significant way the expression
F , and, if we replace the value B involved in the protocol, by the value
BF = B ü F
the frequency of success of the attack would decrease significantly, making
the attack useless for any practical purpose. It is important to notice that the
introduction of BF would not require a significant amount of additional com-
putational power to the Tag, that could compromise the Ultra-Lightweight
nature of SLAP. The following tables show how the success probability of
our attack would change if we implement the proposed fix.
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Even though ¥ 4% could seem a too high probability, we have to notice
that it would require all the 30 attempts proposed at the beginning, so, it is
clear that the attack would be useless once this fix has been implemented.
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Possible fixes:
Table 2.7: Success rate considering all
30 flips
Length Treshold Success
32 6 4.0%
32 7 4.3%
32 8 4.9%
32 10 4.2%
96 6 4.0%
96 7 2.7%
96 8 3.9%
96 10 2.7%
Table 2.8: Success rate considering
only the 15 flips in the right side
Length Treshold Success
32 6 2.2%
32 7 2.3%
32 8 2.6%
32 10 2.3%
96 6 2.9%
96 7 2.7%
96 8 3.9%
96 10 2.7%
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Appendix A
The Utility class
In this appendix you will find some useful methods that we put into the
Utility class. The aim of this class is to provide lower level functionalities,
in order to enhance the code reusage, and let us concentrate on higher-level
tasks.
The first method is used in order to get the Hamming-Weight of a string:
public static int getHammingWeight(String s){
if(s == null)
return -1;
int count = 0;
for(int i = 0; i < s.length(); i++){
if(s.charAt(i) == ’1’)
count++;
}
return count;
}
This second method is used in order to compute the XOR of two strings:
public static String stringXOR(String A, String B){
if(A == null || B == null || A.length() != B.length())
return null;
String result = "";
for(int i = 0; i< A.length(); i++){
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if(A.charAt(i) == B.charAt(i))
result += "0";
else
result += "1";
}
return result;
}
The rotate method is used to left rotate a string X, by w positions:
public static String rotate(String X, int w){
if(X == null || w < 0 || w > X.length())
return "";
if(X == null || X.length() == 0 || w < 0)
return "";
if(w == 0)
return X;
String p1 = X.substring(0, w);
String p2 = X.substring(w);
return p2 + p1;
}
The method flipBit is used in order to flip a specific bit of a string. Later
in this appendix, you will find the method flipAdjacentBits(int f, int
e, String s). This method simply flips all the bits of s from the one with
index f (included), to the one with index e (excluded).
public static String flipBit(int index, String s){
if(index < 0 || s == null || index >= s.length())
return s;
char toFlip = s.charAt(index);
if(toFlip == ’1’)
toFlip = ’0’;
else
toFlip = ’1’;
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StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(s);
sb.setCharAt(index, toFlip);
return sb.toString();
}
The following method is used to get a random binary string with a specific
length.
public static String getRandomString(int length){
if(length < 0)
return null;
String result = "";
String now;
for(int i = 0; i < length; i++){
if(Math.random() > 0.49)
now = "1";
else
now = "0";
result+=now;
}
return result;
}
The next method is the method split; and we already encountered it in
section 1.3.1, inside the method Conversion. Its aim is to split a string into
several substrings, based on the indexes passed as parameter. It is slightly
more complex than the other methods that we have just seen. In order to
carry out its task, after some initial checks, the method has to sort the list
of indexes. This operation is performed for us by the method sort of the
interface Comparator<T>: all we need to do is to tell the comparator our
sort criterion. After this initial task, the rest of the operations is pretty
straightforward.
public static ArrayList<String> split(ArrayList<Integer> indexes,
String s){
if(indexes == null || indexes.size() == 0 ||
!indexes.contains(s.length())){
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return null;
}
//Defining the sort criterion and sorting
indexes.sort(new Comparator<Integer>(){
public int compare(Integer o1, Integer o2) {
int a = o1, b = o2;
if(a < b)
return -1;
else if (b < a)
return 1;
return 0;
}
});
int lastIndex = indexes.get(indexes.size()-1);
if(lastIndex > s.length())
return null;
Iterator<Integer> iterator = indexes.iterator();
ArrayList<String> result = new ArrayList<String>();
int prev = iterator.next();
while(next.hasNext()){
int current = iterator.next();
String splitted = s.substring(prev, current);
result.add(splitted);
prev = current;
}
return result;
}
As an example, we also present the method generateKeys. The aim of this
method is to generate the keys knew1 and knew2 , that are computed after a
successful authentication of the Reader by the Tag. This method has been
very useful when we had to test the e ectiveness of the attack.
public static ArrayList<String> generateKeys(String k1, String k2,
String n, String B, int treshold){
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String k1new = Utility.conversion(treshold, k1, n);
k1new = Utility.stringXOR(k1new, k2);
String k2new = Utility.conversion(treshold, k2, B);
k2new = Utility.stringXOR(k2new, k1);
ArrayList<String> keys = new ArrayList<>();
keys.add(k1new);
keys.add(k2new);
return keys;
}
As the last method, we want to share an implementation of the algorithm
to ”invert” Conversion, that we presented in section 2.4.1.1 . This imple-
mentation of the algorithm produces a B string with three 1s, so, it is not
the easiest version of the procedure. We called the method reverse and it
works with strings of 32 bits.
public static ArrayList<String> reverse(String desiredOutput, treshold){
String white = "11100000000000000000000000000000";
// this function calls Utility.flipBit on the bits at the positions
// 0, 1 and 2 of the string desiredOutput to complement them.
String secondString = flipAdjacentBits(0, 3, desiredOutput);
// here we split the string secondString by the division’s schema
// generated by the string white.
ArrayList<String> temp = Utility.split(
Utility.computeDivision(white, treshold), secondString);
secondString = "";
// the following for cycle right-rotates every substring
// contained in the array temp, by its Hamming-Weight.
for(String t : temp)
secondString += rightRotate(t, getHammingWeight(t));
// we perform on the string white the operations that have already
// been done on secondString
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temp = split(Utility.computeDivision(secondString, treshold), white);
white = "";
for(String t : temp)
white += rightRotate(t, getHammingWeight(t));
ArrayList inputs = new ArrayList<>();
inputs.add(white);
inputs.add(secondString);
return inputs;
}
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